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1 Introduction
The tariff-jumping argument has for long been one of the important rationales for the existence of
horizontal multinational firms (MNEs) in international economics. Yet, in developed countries,
where horizontal multinationals mainly arise, tariffs nowadays generate negligible revenues. In
comparison, profit tax policy seems much more important in terms of the revenues generated
by the respective instruments. Yet, a close look at the literature reveals that surprisingly little
is known about the impact of profit taxation on MNE activity across a relatively large number
of countries. It is well-understood that firms and, especially MNEs, care about effective tax
rates, which are determined by a variety of tax instruments, the most important of which are
four: statutory tax rates, depreciation allowances, withholding tax rates on foreign profits,
and the mode of double taxation relief. With a variety of integration strategies any change in
one or more of these parameters affects each possible margin of adjustment at the firm level
potentially differently.1 Hence, tax policy is faced with the problem that “the” effective tax rate
cannot be altered in a specific way because it is an analytic tax burden measure based on the
neoclassical investment model. What can be changed are the mentioned instruments that affect
alternative margins of adjustment - and the corresponding effective tax rates - simultaneously
and differently.
What are the expected effects of parent and host country parameters of taxation (statutory
corporate and withholding tax rates, and the definition of the tax base) on bilateral multinational
activity in general equilibrium under alternative methods of double taxation relief? How often
and to which extent do countries alter these instruments empirically? And what is their impact
on bilateral stocks of foreign direct investment (FDI)? These issues are of obvious importance
to policy makers. Yet, existing research does not provide an encompassing answer to these
questions, as will be illustrated in detail below.
We collect annual data from national tax codes and bilateral double tax treaties for 52 parent
and 45 host countries over the period 1991 to 2004 to compile the largest existing data-set of cor-
porate tax instruments – parent and host statutory country corporate tax rates, withholding tax
1For instance, relevant extensive margins of adjustment are whether to enter any market at all, whether to
enter a specific market, and how to enter it – e.g., as a national supplier, as an international producer via exports,
or as a multinational firm via foreign affiliate sales (and the latter decision is to be made for all possible forms
of multinational firm integration strategies). Relevant intensive margins of adjustment relate to the extent of
investment, production, etc.
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rates, (net present values of) parent and host country depreciation allowances, and information
about the underlying method of double taxation relief (i.e., credit, exemption, and deduction).
The tax instruments vary at the level of both parent-to-host country-pairs and time. Overall, we
obtain more than about 23,000 data points for each tax component. Before using these data to
assess hypotheses from a theoretical model about the impact of single corporate tax instruments
on MNE activity, we provide an extensive discussion of the feature of the data.
We obtain several insights which inter alia are informative about possible methods for empir-
ical analysis of the impact of taxes on FDI. For instance, it turns out that individual instruments
change quite frequently for the average country so that it is virtually impossible to isolate cor-
porate tax reforms which are surrounded by long enough spell lengths without any change in
corporate taxation. Moreover, changes typically occur simultaneously – at least staggered over
short periods of time – in several instruments. Also, changes are particularly frequent when
considering not only national (or bilateral) changes in host countries but also their neighbors.
Finally, changes in tax instruments are significantly different in country-pairs and years for which
positive FDI data are reported in official statistics than for other observations. These features
are important to consider when selecting empirical methods for the analysis of the impact of
corporate taxation on FDI.
For the latter, we draw hypotheses from a general equilibrium model of trade and multina-
tional firms cum taxation. The importance of relying on general equilibrium models to derive
such hypotheses has been pointed out by Hines (1997, p. 418):
”In the absence of a complete general equilibrium model, it is impossible to predict
with certainty the impact of tax changes on capital demand throughout a multina-
tional firm.”
As a workhorse model, we apply a general equilibrium framework as developed by Markusen
(1997, 2002) and Markusen and Venables (1998, 2000) and modify it to account for three (rather
than two) countries and the role of corporate taxation. This framework seems especially suited
for studying the impact of corporate taxation on FDI, since it proved empirically suitable in
a number of recent empirical studies on the determinants of bilateral multinational activity
(e.g., Carr, Markusen, and Maskus, 2001; Markusen and Maskus, 2002; Blonigen, Davies, and
Head, 2003; Braconier, Norba¨ck, and Urban, 2005). The model allows to analyze the role of
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parent and host country tax parameters under alternative methods of double taxation relief and
provides hypotheses about the sign of the effect of an increase in each parameter of taxation
on multinational activity, separately. In the model, taxation does not only affect the extent of
multinational activity (as, e.g., in Devereux and Hubbard, 2003, and in Devereux and Lockwood,
2006), but also the configuration of plants and the integration strategies of firms in equilibrium.
Empirically, we find that the estimated effect of host country tax instruments is in line with
the hypotheses about the (direct) impact of these variables on MNE activity in general equilib-
rium. The effect of the parent country tax variables often contradicts the hypotheses about their
(indirect) effect in general equilibrium on MNE activity. With regard to the bilateral withhold-
ing tax rate we observe significantly negative impact on bilateral FDI, which is in accordance
with theory. Overall, our findings support the use of individual corporate tax instruments in
theoretical and empirical models of MNE activity. The results indicate that direct effects of host
country and bilateral withholding tax parameters are particularly well identified.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and illus-
trates some of its mean features. Section 3 provides a brief review of the existing literature.
Section 4 presents a Markusen-type knowledge-capital model of trade and multinational firms,
which accounts for the mentioned parameters of taxation and the methods of double taxation
relief. Section 5 discusses the major testable hypotheses relating to the parameters of taxation.
Section 6 describes the empirical specification and presents the empirical findings and provides
a sensitivity analysis. Section 7 concludes with a summary of the most important findings.
2 Corporate tax policy and FDI (1991-2004)
2.1 An anatomy of corporate tax policy
Before analyzing the role of alternative corporate tax parameters for bilateral foreign direct
investment, we provide descriptive evidence about the time variation of the associated policy
parameters among 52 parent and 45 host countries – forming altogether 2,295 country-pairs –
over the period 1991-2004.2 Such an exploration is informative about both the frequency and the
magnitude of changes of the considered tax parameters. In particular, such an analysis may be
2In the sequel, we use the term dyad interchangeably with country-pair and consider, for instance, the pair
with the U.S. as a parent and the U.K. as a host to be different from the one involving the U.K. as a parent and
the U.S. as a host.
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helpful when selecting the appropriate econometric framework for the empirical analysis below.
Let us start by focusing on the frequency of changes in various corporate tax instruments.
There, we look at the proportion of changers among the 45 included host economies over the
years. Table 1 summarizes the corresponding findings at the country-level for statutory corporate
tax rates, depreciation allowances, and withholding tax rates.3
> Table 1 <
First, the table suggests that changes in tax policies occur quite frequently. For instance,
about 30 percent of the host countries undertook some change in the statutory corporate tax
rate between 1991 and 1992, according to the first entry in column [1]. Over the same time
span, about 17 percent of the countries changed the tax base via altering the deductibility of
investment costs (measured by the net present value of depreciation allowances);4 see the first
row and column [2] of Table 1.
The average host country changed its withholding tax rate vis-a`-vis one of its partner coun-
tries in about 11 percent between 1991 and 1992, according to column [3]. Quite remarkably,
this high frequency of changes in tax parameters is not unusual. The bottom row of the table
indicates that about 28 percent of the countries changed their statutory corporate tax rate in
the average period. Similarly, the depreciation allowance parameter changed for more than 13
percent of the countries (and dyads) in the sample. The time pattern in the table suggests that
countries tend to use depreciation allowances less frequently in recent years than they did a
3Note that our dataset is unbalanced, since the tax parameters of interest are not available for all dyads and
years. For instance, with some of the observations, withholding tax rates are not available in a given year, while
statutory tax rates and depreciation allowances are. In other cases, depreciation allowances are not available while
statutory tax rates are. Information about the statutory tax rates would be available for 35,547 observations (2,652
dyads). Among those, we have data on depreciation allowances for 29,580 observations (2,652 dyads). Hence, by
restricting the sample to those units where both statutory corporate tax rates and depreciation allowances are
available, we lose time-series variation in tax rates, but the size of the cross-section remains unaffected. When
taking the latter 29,529 observations and requiring bilateral withholding tax rates to be available as well, we
obtain a sample of 23,358 observations (2,295 dyads). Hence, the limiting factor of our analysis is information
about withholding tax rates.
4Following previous research, we measure depreciation allowances as the net present value of deductions from
the tax base via depreciation (see Devereux and Griffith, 1999, 2003). Depreciation allowances are expressed as
a fraction of the marginal investment. Hence, a value of one of the depreciation allowance parameter indicates
immediate and full depreciation of investment costs. The corresponding parameter may be even larger than unity
in case of extra allowances. On the contrary, a value of zero suggests that investment costs cannot be deducted
at all. Empirically, the depreciation allowance parameter typically takes values between zero and unity. See the
Appendix for further details on the calculation of this measure.
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decade ago. Finally, the average economy’s withholding tax rate changed for almost 8 percent
of the partner countries in the average period.
Whilst the first three columns of Table 1 inform about the frequency of changes in a single
dimension of tax law, columns [4]-[8] of the table shed light on combined changes in the three
parameters. For instance, column [4] summarizes the frequencies at which both statutory cor-
porate tax rates and depreciation allowances are changed (either increased or lowered).5 Such
a combined change takes place at a frequency of more than 5 percent in the average period,
according to the bottom row of column [4]. More than 4 percent of the dyads in the sample
experienced such a combined change in the period 1992-1993.
Column [5] considers a change in either statutory tax rates or depreciation allowances. The
table suggests that, within the average period and the average dyad in the sample, a change in
either of these two parameters occurs at a frequency of 36 percent. As with the other columns
in the table, there is a sizable variation in the corresponding frequencies across periods. For
instance, the ones in column [5] take values between 26 percent in period 1996-1997 and almost
58 percent in periods 1992-1993 and 1993-1994.
In column [6] we look at combined changes in all three instruments together. Hence, any
change in a singular measure of tax policy or combinations thereof with changes in only two
instruments are classified as a zero change here. Consequently, this is the most restrictive
measure of tax policy change considered in Table 1. According to the bottom row of the
table, only 0.51 percent of the countries changed statutory tax rates, depreciation allowances
and withholding tax rates with some partner country at the same time in the average period.
However, in 1994-1995 such a simultaneous change occurred in almost 3 percent of the countries.
Column [7] investigates how often changes in bilateral withholding tax rates and either unilateral
statutory tax rates or depreciation allowances occur within a given period. As the bottom row
of the table indicates, this happens quite frequently, namely for 29 percent of the countries and
periods.
How frequently did tax policy change in at least one of the three dimensions of tax law
considered? As can be seen from the bottom row of the table in Column [8], this was the case
5Obviously, these frequencies should be lower than those of the corresponding changes of statutory tax rates
and depreciation allowances alone. Technically, it would be possible that the frequency is as high as the minimum
of the frequencies of statutory tax rates and depreciation allowances for a given period, but this is not of empirical
importance here.
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for more than 40 percent of the countries in the average period considered. The corresponding
frequency was as high as almost 60 percent in 1992-1993.
> Table 2 <
It should be noted that the frequency of tax changes does not only vary across periods but
even more so across countries covered in our sample. This can be seen from the figures in
Table 2. There, we report the average frequency in the respective tax parameter changes (and
combinations thereof) as in Table 1 across the 45 partner countries and periods. Notice that, as
in Table 1, the average percentage of changes reported at the bottom of Table 2 corresponds to
simple averages of the rows. Hence, the bottom lines in Tables 1 and 2 are identical. Moreover,
the maximum and minimum frequencies in columns [1], [5], [7], and [8] are more than 90 percent
and 0 percent, respectively. Hence, the variation in the frequency of statutory corporate tax
rate changes across economies is huge.6 The maximum and minimum frequencies of changes
in depreciation allowances are 50 percent and 0 percent, respectively. Probably due to the
cumbersome process of arranging negotiations about double-tax treaties at the country-pair
level, the corresponding maximum frequency for withholding tax rates is about 27 percent.
Tables 1 and 2 summarize frequencies for all changes in tax instruments, irrespective of their
magnitude. If we confine our investigation to those changes that were at least one or even as
large as 5 percentage points in the respective tax policy instruments, the frequencies of change
are reduced.7 But do the frequencies drop to (almost) zero? The answer to this question is
clearly no, as can be seen from Table 3.
> Table 3 <
The block of frequencies at the top of the table refers to a minimum requirement of a unitary
percentage point change in the corresponding tax parameters. The block at the bottom of the
table relates to a minimum change of five percentage points in those parameters, respectively.
6The countries which did not change their tax policy in our sample were typically covered for a relatively short
time period. The reason for the latter is lacking information about tax policy in these countries.
7Notice that in terms of the levels of statutory tax rates, depreciation allowances, and withholding tax rates a
change of five percentage points should be considered as huge.
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About 32 percent of the countries changed at least one of the tax policy parameters in the
average period by one percentage point or more (see column [8] in the top panel). And about 15
percent of the country-pairs and periods are characterized by a minimum change of 5 percentage
points in at least one of the considered tax instruments.
The above evidence summarizes the frequency of changes in corporate tax law, yet it does
not provide details on the magnitude of changes in the corresponding tax parameters. This
information can be found in Table 4, where we summarize the average magnitude of the annual
change in any of the tax parameters in specific periods as well as the average period within our
sample. Table 4 consists of two panels. The one on the left hand side reports average changes for
those countries and years which actually faced a non-zero tax reform in the respective instrument
(i.e., given that the tax reform indicator as in Table 1 took a value of one). The panel on the
right hand side of the table does not condition on non-zero reform observations.
> Table 4 <
According to Table 4, the average annual conditional change in statutory corporate tax rates,
depreciation allowance parameters, and country-pair-specific withholding tax rates amounted
to -2.80 percentage points, -0.38 percentage points, and -4.84 percentage points, respectively.
We should be careful with interpreting this evidence as being in favor of ’tax-cut-cum-base-
broadening’ in the sample.8 Own calculations indicate that only 1.97 percent of the countries
undertake tax-cut-cum-base-broadening (the latter figure is not shown in Table 1). This is about
one-third of the countries which changed both statutory corporate tax rates and depreciation
allowances in the average period (according to column [4] of Table 1). With regard to withholding
tax rates, column [3] in Table 1 together with column [3] in Table 4 suggest that withholding
tax rates are changed rather infrequently but if so, the associated change in the tax rate is quite
sizable. Since the panel on the right does not condition on non-zero reform observations, the
average percentage point changes in the respective instruments is much smaller there than on
the left hand side both in each period and on average.
8Tax-cut-cum-base-broadening is a combination of corporate tax rate reduction and a reduction of depreciation
allowances within a certain period.
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2.2 Changes in tax policy and FDI
The aim of this sub-section is to provide some tentative insights into the nexus between tax
policy change and the magnitude of outward FDI. With regard to the latter, we use nominal
stocks of bilateral outward FDI in U.S. dollars between 1991 and 2004 from UNCTAD’s Major
FDI Indicators (2007). We convert the corresponding figures to obtain real stocks of bilateral
outward FDI by using GDP deflators of the parent country with base year 2000.
Let us start by reporting similar statistics as in Tables 1 and 4 about the frequency of tax
policy changes, but focusing on their nexus with bilateral stocks of outward FDI. We will shed
light on quantitative relationships later on and concentrate for now on the average frequencies
for those pairs (and periods) where contemporaneous changes in log stocks of outward FDI were
missing versus non-missing in our sample. The corresponding frequencies are summarized in
Table 5.
> Table 5 <
According to Table 5, the frequency of tax policy reform is significantly different in country-
pairs for which a log-change in FDI is non-missing as compared to other country-pairs. This
indicates that one should probably pay attention to issues of selection into the sample in the
empirical analysis to avoid a potential associated selection bias. Except for Columns [2], [3],
and [6], a change in tax policy instruments occurs at higher frequency, if data on the log annual
change in bilateral FDI are missing.
In a further step, we investigate the magnitude of a change in each of the tax instruments
depending on a missing/non-missing contemporaneous log-change in stocks of outward FDI.
As in Table 4 we report conditional (on a non-zero change) and unconditional changes in tax
parameters.
> Table 6 <
Table 6 indicates that changes in the unilateral tax instruments such as statutory corporate
tax rates and depreciation allowances tend to be significantly different between dyads where
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the contemporaneous change in FDI is missing/non-missing. In contrast, there is no significant
difference between those two categories with regard to withholding tax rates. We may conclude
that unilateral tax law is more likely to matter for the extensive (country-pair coverage) margin
than for bilateral tax law. If anything, the figures suggest that cuts in corporate tax rates are
accompanied by contemporaneous tax base narrowing for observations with non-missing changes
in FDI. In contrast, tax-cut-cum-base-broadening seems to happen more likely for observations
where changes in FDI are missing.
In a final step of our descriptive analysis on the nexus between corporate taxation and
FDI, let us distinguish among changes in the relevant five corporate tax policy instruments:
parent and host country statutory corporate tax rates, parent and host country depreciation
allowances, and withholding tax rates affecting profits that are repatriated from the host to the
parent country. Furthermore, let us ignore for a moment the issue of missing data on changes in
FDI and selection into the sample. Conditional on the availability of both an annual log change
in FDI and data on a (zero or non-zero) change in any of the five tax instruments, we may
decompose the variance in the log change in FDI into several components.
The first component is the variance – in terms of partial sum of squares – which is explained
by the five indicator variables capturing any corporate tax policy change. The second and
third component are the partial sums of squares contributed by fixed year and dyad effects,
respectively.9 These three variance components together with the constant add up to the model
sum of squares. The latter plus the residual sum of squares give the total sum of squares of
the left-hand-side variable. The goal of this analysis is to see whether the five tax instruments
together contribute to explaining the variation in the growth of FDI or not. Of course, we should
bear in mind that we ignore here any influence of other covariates and account for tax policy
changes by indicator variables rather than continuous changes. The latter will be the focus of a
multivariate analysis of covariance in Section 6.
> Table 7 <
Table 7 contains three panels, which differ in terms of the timing of the left-hand-side variable.
9Notice that the left-hand-side of the model is a log-change. Accordingly, jointly significant fixed dyad effects
would suggest that there is a significant difference in the annual growth of FDI across country-pairs.
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The one at the top uses the once-lagged log change of outward stocks of FDI (i.e., the change
between years t− 2 and t− 1). The center panel employs the contemporaneous change in FDI
(between years t − 1 and t). The panel at the bottom uses the lead of FDI (i.e., the change
between years t and t+1). This analysis may shed some light on the timing of tax reform effects
on FDI, a possible anticipation thereof and, eventually, the direction of causality.
The results in Table 7 support the following conclusions. First, fixed dyad effects can be
safely ignored in the analysis of growth of bilateral FDI. Second, fixed annual effects are impor-
tant and their omission would likely lead to biased parameter estimates. Third, corporate tax
reform matters in a statistically significant way only for post-reform FDI growth but not for
contemporaneous or once-lagged FDI.
2.3 Some tentative conclusions about the empirical analysis of the role of
taxation for FDI
The descriptive exploration of changes in the three tax policy instruments suggests the following:
(i) changes in at least one parameter occur very frequently for the average country-pair; (ii) there
is a significant overlap in the changes across the tax instruments; (iii) changes do not occur in
selected countries or years but they are all over the place regarding both countries and time.
These features of profit tax reform clearly call for a multivariate analysis. For instance,
the pattern of changes precludes the application of tools suited for event-studies or natural
experiments because of arguments (i)-(iii) above: feature (i) renders the time-wise isolation of
tax policy changes impossible; feature (ii) does not allow for isolating the impact of single tax
policy measures in a univariate analysis; and (iii) suggests that a suitable control group without
any change in one or several tax instruments over a reasonably long contemporaneous time span
is hard to find.
Obviously, the explorative data analysis is helpful in determining stylized facts about cor-
porate tax policy in a large sample of country-pairs and years. Also, it assists the selection of
appropriate empirical tools for analyzing the impact of corporate tax policy on FDI. However,
the identification of the quantitative effects of corporate taxation of FDI calls for a less parsi-
monious empirical model whose specification needs to rest on economic theory. The subsequent
two sections are therefore dedicated to a survey of previous empirical and theoretical work on
the matter and the outline of a model to understand the role of the five mentioned parent
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and host country tax instruments (as employed in Table 7) on multinational activity in general
equilibrium.
The models to be used in an empirical analysis of the nexus between corporate tax policy
and stocks of FDI should account for sample selection, involve levels (rather than changes) of
log stocks of bilateral FDI as the dependent variable to avoid an excessive loss of observations,
and include dyad as well as time fixed effects. Based on the previous insights, tax policy changes
should be allowed to exert a once-lagged impact on FDI.
3 Previous research
Under which conditions and to what extent corporate taxes influence a firm’s location and
production decisions is lively debated, not only among policy makers but also among researchers
(see Hines, 1997, 1999; Gresik, 2001; Devereux, 2007, for comprehensive surveys). If firms cannot
arbitrarily shift their profits abroad, taxes reduce their after-tax profits and this, in turn, affects
both the location and the volume of FDI. In that case, a high tax burden in a host country
represents an impediment to its inbound FDI, even if its effect is partly offset to the extent
that governments use tax revenues to reduce investment costs. In fact, this reasoning may
explain why several industrialized countries have recently reduced their corporate tax rates.10
For instance, in the Western European economies corporate tax rates have been reduced in
response to the much lower tax rates in Central and Eastern Europe.
Empirical evidence tends to confirm the presumption that taxation is decisive for production
and location decisions of MNEs. The bulk of results is available for the U.S. (see Hines, 1997,
for an excellent overview). Three strands of the literature can be distinguished here. One of
them analyzes the impact of U.S. corporate tax rates on inbound FDI (see, e.g., Hartman,
1984; Bartik, 1985; Coughlin, Terza, and Arromdee, 1991; Head, Ries, and Swenson, 1999).
A second line of research studies the effects of host country taxes on U.S. outbound FDI (see
Grubert and Mutti, 1991, 2000; Hines and Rice, 1994; Devereux and Griffith, 1998; Grubert and
10Within the OECD, the statutory corporate tax rate (excluding local corporate income taxes) fell by 15 percent
between 2000 and 2005, where the strongest reductions took place in Austria (2005, from 34 to 25 percent),
Belgium (2005, from 39 to 33 percent), Canada (several reductions 2000-2005, from 28 to 21 percent), Germany
(2001, from 40 to 25 percent), Iceland (2002, from 30 to 18 percent), Ireland (several reductions 2000-2005, from
24 to 12.5 percent) and Luxembourg (2002, from 30 to 22 percent). Among the Eastern European members, the
lowest levels of corporate tax rates amount to 16 percent (Hungary, since 2004) and 19 percent (Poland and the
Slovak Republic, since 2004), respectively.
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Slemrod, 1998; Altshuler, Grubert, and Newlon, 2001; Mutti and Grubert, 2004; Desai, Foley,
and Hines, 2005). A third strand of work considers both parent and host country taxation
by additionally accounting for the role of the underlying method of double taxation relief, i.e.,
whether (repatriated) profits of foreign affiliates are taxed on a territorial or a worldwide basis
in the country where the headquarters are located (see Slemrod, 1990; Shah and Slemrod, 1991;
Cummins and Hubbard, 1995; Swenson, 1994, 2001; Hines, 1996). In general, the U.S. evidence
reveals that inbound FDI is negatively affected by the U.S. tax burden,11 and U.S. outbound
FDI is positively (negatively) associated with domestic (host country) tax rates. Although one
would expect that the impact of tax rates differs between countries applying the credit and
exemption method (see, e.g., Slemrod, 1990),12 there is no clear-cut empirical support for this
view.
Only a few studies consider a broader set of country-pairs. Devereux and Freeman (1995),
using bilateral FDI flows between seven countries (including the U.S.) from 1984 to 1989 and
referring to a cost-of-capital concept of taxation, find that a firm’s choice between domestic
and foreign investment as such is not influenced by taxation. However, given that a firm has
decided to invest abroad, taxation is decisive for where the investment takes place. The results
of Be´nassy-Que´re´, Fontagne´, and Lahre`che-Re´vil (2005), relying on bilateral FDI flows among
11 OECD countries over the period 1984-2000 and using statutory corporate tax rates as well
as (forward-looking) effective marginal (EMTR) and average tax rates (EATR) as published in
Devereux, Griffith, and Klemm (2002), indicate a significant role of tax differentials for foreign
plant location. Similar evidence is provided by Egger, Loretz, Pfaffermayr and Winner (2009),
who focus on unilateral and bilateral EMTR and EATR of 22 OECD countries between 1991
and 2002. Razin, Rubinstein, and Sadka (2005) point out that statutory tax rates affect FDI
flows in two ways. First, they determine whether it is profitable for any firm to invest in a
particular host country at all (sample selection). Second, given that some investment takes
place, they affect the magnitude of these investments. Razin, Rubinstein, and Sadka (2005) find
11One notable exception is Swenson (1994), who finds that the increased after-tax cost of capital after the Tax
Reform Act 1986 induced an increase in U.S. inbound FDI. The underlying reason is that the broadening of the
tax base raised the attractiveness of U.S. assets for foreign investors whose parent countries allowed a tax credit
against taxes abroad (see Scholes and Wolfson, 1990, for a theoretical foundation of this argument).
12Under the credit method, foreign-earned profits are taxed both in the parent and the host country, but the
foreign taxes are deductible from the domestic tax liability. Under the exemption method, by way of contrast,
foreign-earned profits are only taxed abroad.
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supportive evidence for these hypotheses in a panel of bilateral OECD FDI flows. Regarding
investment flows to Central and Eastern European countries, Carstensen and Toubal (2004)
observe a significant negative impact of the difference in host and parent country statutory
corporate tax rates on inward FDI.13
Overall, previous empirical research is characterized by two features. First, most of the
existing literature considers the parent and/or host country tax rate or composite measures of
tax burden (e.g., forward- or backward-looking effective tax rates). The former approach ignores
important tax-related determinants of FDI, such as depreciation allowances or host country
withholding taxes (see Clark, 2000; OECD, 2001). The problem with the latter approach is that
it is difficult to draw strong conclusions about the ’composite’ impact of the tax components
through effective tax rates on MNE activity.14 In particular, our theoretical hypotheses shed
light on the fact that some of the components of effective tax rates exert a non-monotonic effect
on FDI, where the sign of the impact depends on the relative prevalence of multinational versus
national firms.
Second, many of the existing applications tend to rely on an eclectic approach to specifying
empirical FDI equations. In this regard, Hines (1999, p. 311) emphasizes that
”[O]ne of the difficulties facing all cross-sectional studies of FDI location is the in-
evitable omission of many important determinants of FDI that may be correlated
with tax rates and therefore bias estimation of tax elasticities.”
Of course, this argument does not advocate an empirical analysis that uses all available
explanatory variables, disregarding their theoretical relevance. But rather, it makes the case
for a specification of FDI capturing the most important empirical determinants consistent with
theory. Following this advice, we employ an empirical specification based on a variant of the
knowledge-capital model of multinational firms.
13De Mooij and Ederveen (2003), performing a meta-analysis based on 25 empirical studies on FDI and taxation,
estimate a (median) tax rate elasticity of -3.3. Focusing on U.S. studies, Hines (1997) reports a tax rate elasticity
of approximately -0.6.
14Basically, effective tax rates are an aggregate measure of company tax burden, i.e., the same level of the
effective tax rate may be a result of different combinations of its components. Hence, an increase of effective tax
rates may be due to entirely different changes in the underlying components. More importantly, it can be shown
that in a general equilibrium model of trade and multinationals as the one applied below, effective (marginal
and average) tax rates change across endowment configurations, even if the tax parameters themselves remain
unchanged. Put differently, each margin of adjustment faces its own effective tax rate. Hence, aggregate effective
tax rates are endogenous even for given tax instruments.
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4 A numerically solvable three-country general equilibrium model
of multinational activity and taxation
With three countries, complex (i.e., mixed horizontal and vertical) integration strategies of
multinational firms become possible (see Yeaple, 2003). In particular, we consider the possibil-
ity of export-platform multinational activity (see, e.g., Ekholm, Forslid, and Markusen, 2007),
where firms decide to set up two production facilities – one at home and one abroad – while
serving the third country (which may be a conglomerate of economies) through exports from
the foreign subsidiary. Along with export platform multinationals, the standard firm types may
arise: national firms which serve domestic consumers locally and foreign ones through exports;
horizontal multinationals which run one production facility in each foreign market to serve con-
sumers locally in general; and vertical multinationals which run a single production facility in
only one of the foreign markets and serve consumers worldwide from there.15
The model consists of three countries indexed {i, j, k} = {1, 2, 3}. Each of them hosts a single
representative consumer who derives utility from the consumption of two goods, X and Z. Z
is a homogeneous (agricultural) good produced at constant returns to scale. There is a large
number of varieties of (manufactures) X that are imperfect substitutes as in Dixit and Stiglitz
(1977) based upon Cobb-Douglas preferences with constant income shares of γ and (1 − γ),
respectively.
X can be produced by four principal types of firms. National enterprises (NEs) serve domestic
consumers locally and foreign ones via exports. The corresponding number of NEs in country
i is denoted by ni. Horizontal MNEs (HMNEs) headquartered in country i run a plant each at
home and one in each foreign market. Hence, they serve consumers in all three countries through
local production and do not engage in trade. The central motives to enter as an HMNE are the
avoidance of trade costs and the exploitation of multi-plant economies of scale. hi indicates the
number of HMNEs headquartered in i. Vertical MNEs (VMNEs) unbundle their headquarters’
activities from the production process. They produce headquarters’ services in the skilled labor
abundant economy and locate production in an unskilled labor abundant country. VMNEs serve
15Depending on which market the production facility is located, each parent country may run two different
types of vertical MNEs in a three-country model. Similarly, depending on which market the export-platform is
located in, there will be two possible types of export-platform MNEs in such a model. We will use parent and
foreign subsidiary location indices in the sequel to distinguish among these types of firms.
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foreign consumers in the host country locally and consumers in both the domestic and the other
foreign market via exports from their foreign subsidiary. Since the foreign subsidiary of a VMNE
headquartered in i may either be located in j or k, we need to distinguish these two types of
VMNEs. We do so by using two subscripts, where the first one refers to the parent and the
second one to the host country. Accordingly vij denotes the number of i’s VMNEs with a foreign
subsidiary in j and vik denotes this country’s VMNEs with a foreign subsidiary in k.
Finally, there are export-platform MNEs (EMNEs) which are horizontal to the extent that
they serve parent country consumers and host country consumers through local production (like
an HMNE), and they are vertical in nature since they deliver products to the third market by
exports from the foreign platform. Similar to VMNEs, the number of foreign markets to locate
an export-platform in is larger than the number of foreign subsidiaries EMNEs actually set up.
Therefore, we need to distinguish between i’s EMNEs with a platform in j from those with a
platform in k. The number of the former is eij while the number of the latter is eik.
Quantities of X are indexed as follows. The superscript indicates the firm type, the first
subscript refers to the country where the firm is headquartered, the second one denotes the
country where the variety is produced, and the third subscript labels the economy where the
variety is consumed. For instance, Xniij is the production of manufactures produced by a single
NE of i in i for consumers in j. Consider an HMNE with headquarters in country i. Then, Xhijj
indicates this firm’s production in country j for consumers there. Now, focus on a VMNE with
headquarters in i. Such a firm’s production in country j for consumers in i is denoted by Xviji.
Similarly, production of an EMNE which is headquartered in i in its platform in j for consumers
in k is referred to by Xeijk. The use of subscripts for the homogeneous good Z is analogous to
X.
Preferences are assumed to be a Cobb-Douglas nest of the homogeneous Z-good and the
differentiated X-good. The price of Z serves as the nume´raire. Ui describes the utility function
of a representative household in country i, where µ denotes the fixed expenditure share for
differentiated products and σ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between differentiated product
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varieties:
Ui = X
µ
ic
 3∑
j=1
Zjji
1−µ ,
Xic ≡
{
3∑
j=1
[
nj
(
Xnjji
1 + τji
)σ−1
σ
+ hj
(
Xhjii
)σ−1
σ
]
+
∑
k 6=j
[
vkj
(
X
vkj
kji
1 + τji
)σ−1
σ
]} σ
σ−1
+
∑
j 6=i
[
eij
(
X
eij
iii
)σ−1
σ
]
+
∑
k 6=j,j 6=i
[
ekj
(
X
ekj
kji
1 + τji
)σ−1
σ
]}
. (1)
Cross-border trade of the differentiated X-good, say, from i to j is subject to iceberg trans-
port costs (τij) for the shipment of each unit. For intra-national transportation, we use the
conventional assumption in related research that trade costs are zero (τii = 0). Homogeneous
Z-goods are tradeable at zero costs.
For each firm type and location, the utility maximization of consumers yields demand for a
single variety of manufactures
X`iii =
(
p`iii
)−σ
P σ−1i µEi ∀ i ∈ {1, 2, 3} ∧ ∀ ` ∈ {n, h, eij , eik}
X`jii =
(
p`jii
)−σ
P σ−1i µEi ∀ i 6= j ∈ {1, 2, 3} ∧ ∀ ` ∈ {h, vji, eji}
X
vij
ijk =
(
pvijk
)−σ
P σ−1k µEk ∀ i 6= j, k ∈ {1, 2, 3}
X
eij
ijk =
(
peijk
)−σ
P σ−1k µEk ∀ i 6= j, i 6= k ∈ {1, 2, 3}
Xnjji =
(
pnjji
)−σ
P σ−1i µEi ∀ i 6= j ∈ {1, 2, 3}. (2)
Ei represents the total expenditures of consumers in country i. The price index Pi of differenti-
ated goods consumed in country i can be written as
Pi =
{ 3∑
j=1
[
nj
(
pnjji
)1−σ
+ hj
(
phjii
)1−σ]
+
∑
k 6=j
[
vkj
(
p
vkj
kji
)1−σ]
(3)
+
∑
j 6=i
[
eij
(
p
eij
iii
)1−σ]
+
∑
k 6=j,j 6=i
[
ekj
(
p
ekj
kji
)1−σ]} 1
1−σ
.
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Expenditures for X and Z are allocated as follows:
Xic =
µEi
Pi
,
3∑
j=1
Zjji = (1− µ)Ei. (4)
4.1 Production and labor markets
The production function for Z is a CES technology which is identical in all three economies. It
uses skilled labor (S) and unskilled labor (L) at a technical rate of substitution of 1/(1− ρ):
3∑
j=1
Ziij = [aS
ρ
i + (1− a)Lρi ]
1
ρ , (5)
where a is a weighting parameter. Since all firms within a country face the same homothetic
technology and identical factor prices, Z-sector input coefficients are identical across firms. Let
wSi and wLi denote the factor rewards for skilled and unskilled labor in country i. Skipping the
arguments, these input coefficients are determined as
aLZi =
(
wLi
1− a
) 1
ρ−1
[(
wρSi
a
) 1
ρ−1
+
(
wρLi
1− a
) 1
ρ−1
]− 1
ρ
(6)
aSZi =
(wSi
a
) 1
ρ−1
[(
wρSi
a
) 1
ρ−1
+
(
wρLi
1− a
) 1
ρ−1
]− 1
ρ
. (7)
Perfect competition among the producers of Z ensures zero profits so that unit costs satisfy
aLZiwLi + aSZiwSi ≥ 1 ⊥ Ziii ≥ 0, Ziij ≥ 0 ∀ i 6= j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, (8)
where ⊥ indicates that at least one of the adjacent conditions has to hold with equality. Zero
trade costs lead to an equalization of marginal costs across countries.
The production of manufactures X uses both factors in fixed proportions (see Markusen,
2002), where aLX and aSX are the corresponding input coefficients for production. The set-
up of firms in the X-sector requires skilled labor in order to produce firm-specific assets and
blueprints as well as unskilled labor to set up plant-specific assets (production facilities). In
line with the knowledge-capital model literature, we assume that fixed input requirements are
highest for horizontal MNEs, lower for vertical MNEs, and lowest for NEs. Specifically, national
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firms need 2 units of skilled labor, while (horizontal and vertical) MNEs employ 2+θ units with
θ ≥ 0. This accounts for the possibly higher firm-specific fixed costs of running a multinational
network. For NEs and for domestic plants of horizontal MNEs the plant-specific fixed input
requirements are equal to 1 unit of unskilled labor. Setting up a plant abroad requires 1 + γ
units of unskilled labor with γ ≥ 0, reflecting the associated possible fixed cost disadvantages of
MNEs.
Under full employment, the factor market clearing conditions for unskilled and skilled labor
in country i require
Li ≥ aLX
[ 3∑
j=1
(
niX
n
iij + hjX
h
jii
)
+
∑
j 6=i
(
vji
3∑
k=1
Xvjik
)
+
∑
j 6=i
(
eijX
e
iii
)
+
∑
k 6=j,j 6=i
(
ekiX
e
kij
)]
+
[
aLZi
3∑
j=1
Ziij
]
+ ni + hi +
∑
j 6=i
eij + (1 + γ)
∑
j 6=i
(hj + vji + eji) ⊥ wLi ≥ 0,
Si ≥ aSX
[ 3∑
j=1
(
niX
n
iij + hjX
h
jii
)
+
∑
j 6=i
(
vji
3∑
k=1
Xvjik
)
+
∑
j 6=i
(
eijX
e
iii
)
+
∑
k 6=j,j 6=i
(
ekiX
e
kij
)]
+
[
aSZi
3∑
j=1
Ziij
]
+ 2ni + (2 + θ)
[
hi +
∑
j 6=i
(
vij + eij
)]
⊥ wSi ≥ 0. (9)
Variable unit costs for the production of an X-variety are given by cXi = aSXwSi+aLXwLi.
Fixed costs are financed by operating profits. There is a fixed markup over variable costs,
which is determined by the elasticity of substitution between varieties. Identical technologies
and price elasticities of demand ensure that the domestic price of a locally produced good
(the mill price) is identical in equilibrium across all firms producing there. Therefore, it is
sufficient to use a single subscript for the producer prices, indicating the country of production:
pi ≡ pniii = phiii = peijiii = pvjijii (∀ j 6= i).
The consumer price for varieties exported from country i to j is then pi(1 + τ) ≡ pniij =
pvkikij (∀ j 6= i) = pekikij (∀ k 6= j, j 6= i). Given that the demand for all varieties is positive
due to our assumptions, the mill price of a variety of X in i is determined by
pi = cXi
σ
σ − 1 . (10)
Free entry of firms implies that after-tax profits are zero. Therefore, the corresponding zero-
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profit conditions determine the number of firms. NEs in i face fixed costs of FCni = 2wSi+wLi.
After subtracting depreciation allowances, these fixed costs have to be covered by after-tax
operating profits. Operating profits of NEs are subject to the domestic statutory corporate tax
rate (ti). We denote the share of fixed costs which is deductible from the tax base by δi.16
NEs in country i exist if their fixed costs are equal to after tax profits including depreciation
allowances (Dni )
FCni ≥
pi
(∑3
j=1X
n
iij
)
σ
(1− ti) + δiti(2wSi + wLi)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Dni
⊥ ni ≥ 0. (11)
The fixed costs of MNEs are FChi = (2 + θ)wSi + wLi +
∑
j 6=i(1 + γ)wLj for an HMNE,
FC
vij
i = (2+θ)wSi+(1+γ)wLj for a vij−type VMNE, and FCeiji = (2+θ)wSi+wLi+(1+γ)wLj
for a vij − type VMNE respectively. The corresponding zero profit conditions are given by
FChi ≥
3∑
j=1
[
pjX
h
ijj
σ
(1− tj)(1− tMji )
]
+ δiti(2wSi + wLi) +
∑
j 6=i
[
δjtj(tMji − twj )(1 + γ)wLj︸ ︷︷ ︸
Dhii
]
+
∑
j 6=i
[
δjtj(1 + twj )(1 + γ)wLj︸ ︷︷ ︸
Dhij
]
⊥ hi ≥ 0 (12)
FC
vij
i ≥
pj
(∑3
k=1X
vij
ijk
)
σ
(1− tj)(1− tMji ) + δjtj(tMji − twj )(1 + γ)wLj︸ ︷︷ ︸
D
vij
ii
+ δjtj(1 + twj )(1 + γ)wLj︸ ︷︷ ︸
D
vij
ij
⊥ vij ≥ 0 (13)
FC
eij
i ≥
∑
j 6=k
pj
(∑
k 6=iX
eij
ijk
)
σ
(1− tj)(1− tMji )
+ δiti(2wSi + wLi) + δjtj(tMji − twj )(1 + γ)wLj︸ ︷︷ ︸
D
eij
ii
+ δjtj(1 + twj )(1 + γ)wLj︸ ︷︷ ︸
D
eij
ij
⊥ eij ≥ 0, (14)
16An alternative would be to apply depreciation allowances for variable costs additionally. However, since
variable costs are not deductible at the same rate as fixed costs, we do not rely on this variant in the main text
but relegate it to a sensitivity analysis. We briefly discuss the outcome of this model variant in Footnote 26,
below.
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where Dhij indicates the depreciation allowances of a horizontal MNE with headquarters in coun-
try i at market j, and similarly for the other depreciation allowances. Our setting implicitly
assumes that fixed costs are deductible only in the country where the investment takes place.
We further assume that MNEs fully repatriate the profits of foreign subsidiaries to the domestic
headquarters (see Hartman, 1985; and Sinn, 1993, for a discussion). In this case, operating
profits of foreign affiliate firms are subject to corporate taxation in the host country (tj). Un-
der repatriation, foreign-earned profits are additionally subject to withholding taxes (twj ) and
taxation at home (tMji ), where the first subscript in t
M
ji denotes the origin and the latter the
destination of the dividend flow. Hence, if double taxation is not alleviated unilaterally or bi-
laterally (via tax treaties), foreign affiliate income is exposed to double taxation. The extent to
which double taxation occurs depends on the method of double taxation relief (Alworth, 1988,
provides a detailed discussion).17 In general, tMii = 0 but t
M
ji will be different from zero:
tMji = t
w
j (exemption)
= max
[
ti − tj
1− tj , t
w
j
]
(credit)
= ti(1− twj ) + twj (deduction) (15)
All production factors are owned by the households, so that consumer income is determined
by the sum of factor rewards in country i (wSiSi + wLiLi) plus the eventual transfers of tax
revenues to them. Below, we discuss two modes of public spending of tax revenues, where only
one of them involves such transfers.
4.2 Public sector
The only source of tax revenues are taxes on operating profits of firms. Hence, tax revenues for
country i can be summarized as
17See Bond and Samuleson (1989), Janeba (1995), and Davies (2003) for a theoretical analysis on the effects of
the methods of double taxation relief on the volume of foreign investment. Davies (2004) provides a survey.
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Gi = ni
 3∑
j=1
Xniij
 pi
σ
ti −Dni
+ hi
Xhiii piσ ti +∑
j 6=i
[
Xhijj
pj
σ
(1− tj)(tMji − twj )
]
−Dhii

+
∑
j 6=i
vij
[(
3∑
k=1
X
vij
ijk
)
pj
σ
(1− tj)(tMji − twj )−Dvijii
]
+
∑
j 6=i
eij
Xeijiii piσ ti +
∑
k 6=i
X
eij
ijk
 pj
σ
(1− tj)(tMji − twj )
−Deijii

+
∑
j 6=i
hj
[
Xhjii
pi
σ
(ti − titwi + twi )−Dhji
]
+
∑
j 6=i
vji
[(
3∑
k=1
X
vji
jik
)
pi
σ
(ti − titwi + twi )−Dvjiji
]
+
∑
j 6=i
eji
∑
k 6=i
X
eji
jik
 pi
σ
(ti − titwi + twi )−Dejiji
 . (16)
Tax revenues are either used to finance a lump-sum transfer to consumers or to provide
public infrastructure to the firms to lower their fixed input requirements (see Kellenberg, 2003,
for a treatment of infrastructure in a model with MNEs). In case of lump-sum transfers, gross
national income of country i (Ei) includes the tax revenues collected by its government. In
case of public infrastructure provision, no such transfers occur and gross national income equals
total factor income in i. We assume that one unit of public infrastructure needs one unit of
skilled labor and one unit of unskilled labor.18 Accordingly, public infrastructure (Ii) in country
i equals
Ii =
Gi
wSi + wLi
. (17)
Under the assumption that public infrastructure reduces the fixed factor requirement of firms
headquartered in a given country, the fixed costs of setting up a national firm in country i are
FCni =
2wSi + wLi
(Ii + 1)β
, (18)
where β > 0 is a scaling parameter. Similarly, the fixed costs for HMNEs, VMNEs, and
EMNEs are then reduced by the public infrastructure in the relevant country
18This guarantees that the production of public infrastructure as such only induces minor effects on relative
factor prices of skilled and unskilled labor.
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FChi =
(2 + θ)wSi + wLi
(Ii + 1)β
+
∑
j 6=i
[
(1 + γ)wLj
(Ij + 1)β
]
, (19)
FC
vij
i =
(2 + θ)wSi
(Ii + 1)β
+
(1 + γ)wLj
(Ij + 1)β
, (20)
FC
eij
i =
(2 + θ)wSi + wLi
(Ii + 1)β
+
(1 + γ)wLj
(Ij + 1)β
. (21)
4.3 Model parameterization
Due to the non-linearities and the numerous possible corner solutions, an analytical solution of
the model is infeasible (see Markusen and Venables, 1998, 2000; Markusen, 2002). Therefore, we
derive the empirically testable hypotheses of interest by means of numerical simulation, using
the following parameter values. World factor endowments are set at L = 300 and K = 75.
a = 0.9 for the skilled labor coefficient in the CES technology of Z. The production of the
differentiated X-good is relatively more skilled labor intensive with fixed input coefficient of
aLX = 0.75 and aSX = 0.25 (see Markusen, 2002). We parameterize the additional effort of
transferring knowledge abroad with θ = 0.1 and the additional resources required for setting up
a plant abroad with γ = 0.1. According to the United Nation’s World Trade Database, the share
of manufacturing goods trade in the 1990s is about 70 to 80 percent of total trade. Therefore,
we assume an expenditure share for manufactures of µ = 0.8. We consider σ = 4 as value for
the elasticity of substitution, which is close to the one usually applied in the knowledge-capital
literature (see Markusen, 2002). Trade costs are assumed identical between the different country
pairs, and high with τ = 0.25 being in line with Carr, Markusen, and Maskus (2001). Finally,
the elasticity of substitution in the production of the homogeneous good is (1/(1− ρ)) = 3.
Concerning the public sector, we initially set the corporate tax rates symmetrically at ti =
tj = tk = 0.3, which roughly resembles the average corporate tax rate in the OECD countries in
2004. We account for the fact that bilateral tax treaties prevail among the countries of interest
and set the withholding tax rate at a low level, twi = t
w
j = t
w
k = 0.05. We assume that about
20 percent of fixed costs are tax deductible so that δi = δj = δk = 0.2.19 In the case where
19In our empirical analysis below, we measure tax base reducing allowances by depreciation rates including first-
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tax revenues are used to finance public infrastructure, the scaling parameter determining the
relative importance of public infrastructure is set at β = 0.1.
5 Simulation results and hypotheses
To facilitate the comparison with the existing literature we hold the size of the third country
fixed at one third of the world endowment, and run simulations for different configurations in
factor endowments in country i and j. Similarly we are only interested in the bilateral outbound
FDI of country i. Hence, we measure foreign affiliate activity as the share of outbound affiliate
production of country i (defined as hiXhijj + vij(X
v
iji + X
v
ijj + X
v
ijk) + eij(X
e
ijj + X
e
ijk)) in the
combined production of X in country i and j by firms headquartered in these countries. Without
corporate taxation (i.e., setting all parameters of taxation to zero) the chosen calibration of the
model leads to a pattern of affiliate production which is virtually identical to the one in Carr,
Markusen, and Maskus (2001) and in Markusen and Maskus (2002). Horizontal multinational
firms prevail, if country size and relative factor endowments are not too different. Vertical
multinationals and export platforms come into existence only, if relative factor endowment
differences (i.e., production cost differences) are large enough. Higher trade costs (foreign plant
set-up costs) discourage NEs and EMNEs (MNEs).
Figure 1 displays foreign affiliate production in an Edgeworth box with relative factor en-
dowments on the axes for the benchmark case without corporate taxation. First, consider factor
endowments along the main diagonal indicating that country i and j have identical relative
factor endowments. Here, NEs and horizontal MNEs prevail, and foreign affiliate production
is higher the more similar the countries are in size. At the center of the Edgeworth box both
countries are identical to the third country, which implies a market structure of symmetrical
horizontal MNEs. Moving from the center towards the North-Western corner implies larger
differences in relative factor endowments, inducing an increase in foreign affiliate production by
vertical MNEs, all else equal.
year extra depreciations (see Devereux and Griffith, 1999, 2003). The net present value of depreciation allowances
for tax purposes is about 30 percent higher than the assumed depreciation rate in the model simulation. The means
of the periodical depreciation rates in the sample are about 22 percent (machinery) and 5 percent (buildings),
respectively.
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Figure 1: Share of affiliate production without corporate taxation
5.1 Effects of bilateral tax rate changes on FDI
In the subsequent analysis we introduce corporate taxation and primarily focus on the case
where tax revenues are used to finance public infrastructure. However, in qualitative terms the
effects are similar for lump-sum transfers. The reason is that corporate taxation affects the
equilibrium plant configuration even if tax revenues are redistributed in a lump-sum fashion.20
Figure 2 displays the share of foreign affiliate production under the exemption or credit
method. We further assume that both countries have an exemption/credit system with the third
country.21 In this case, multinational activity is affected only to a minor extent by corporate
taxation (see the small differences between Figures 1 and 2). Only for small countries near the
main diagonal we observe less foreign affiliate activity of horizontal MNEs, resulting from the
additional tax burden for MNEs due to withholding taxes. The foreign affiliate activities of
vertical MNEs located in the North-Western corner of the Edgeworth box remain more or less
unaffected by profit taxation.
Compared to tax credit and exemption methods the deduction method is associated with a
higher tax burden on MNEs. Again, we maintain the assumption that both countries apply an
exemption system with the third country. Accordingly, the distortion of multinational activity
20Figures and other results for the lump-sum transfer case are available from the authors upon request but are
left out here for the sake of brevity.
21Note that under the assumption of symmetric tax rates in the initial equilibrium the exemption and the credit
methods lead to identical results with regard to the relationship between corporate taxation and MNE activity.
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Figure 2: Share of affiliate production with exemption system
induced by corporate taxation becomes more evident under deduction. Figure 3 illustrates that
the foreign activity of horizontal MNEs is significantly reduced as compared to the case of the
exemption and the credit method, especially for small countries. In small economies, firms
choose serving the foreign markets via exports since double taxation reduces foreign affiliate
profits required to cover the fixed costs abroad. Further, firms from the third country have a
tax advantage as they are under an exemption system. The other explanation for the absence of
bilateral direct investment from country i to j is the relative attractiveness of the third country,
as there is an exemption system there. As a consequence, export platforms in country k emerge.
However, if country j is large enough and tax revenue is used to finance public infrastructure,
horizontal MNEs come into existence even under deduction. In this case, tax revenues are high
enough to finance public infrastructure, reducing fixed plant setup costs to compensate the
disadvantages of double taxation. Again, the production decisions of vertical MNEs are nearly
unaffected by double taxation.
In the following, we focus on four factor endowment configurations within the Edgeworth
box to derive the effects of the considered tax parameters on MNE activity.22 For each of these
endowment points and each method of double taxation relief (credit, exemption, and deduction),
we compare the foreign affiliate production in the reference case as described in Section 4.3 with
22We do not consider any impact of taxation on outbound MNE activity of an unskilled labor abundant economy,
since such an economy does not run foreign affiliates.
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Figure 3: Share of affiliate production with deduction system
a counterfactual where the taxation parameters of interest are increased by one percentage point,
one at a time. Our parameterization (symmetric tax rates) is not suitable for illustrating the
differential effects of taxation under the credit method as compared to exemption. Therefore, we
allow initial tax rate differentials between domestic and foreign countries in alternative scenarios.
The results are summarized in Table 8.
We consider the following endowment configurations. First, one where country i is small
compared to j but the relative factor endowments are identical across the two countries at
Li/(Li + Lj) = Si/(Si + Sj) = 0.15. There, country i’s foreign affiliate production is small,
amounting to only 5.86 percent of the combined production of X under tax credit or exemption
(there is no MNE activity under deduction at this endowment configuration). Second, still
at zero relative factor endowment differences, Li/(Li + Lj) = Si/(Si + Sj) = 0.85, country
i is large relative to j. Still, its MNE activity is relatively small. Country i’s foreign affiliate
production amounts to 14.12 percent of the world production of X under tax credit or exemption
and to 10.89 percent under deduction, respectively. Third, in the center of the Edgeworth box
the two countries are identical in size and relative factor endowments with Li/(Li + Lj) =
Lj/(Li + Lj) = Si/(Si + Sj) = Sj/(Si + Sj) = 0.5. Therefore, the production of horizontal
MNEs is evenly distributed and vertical MNEs do not exist. The foreign affiliate production
of country i accounts for 25 percent of the overall production of X by NEs and MNEs in both
countries, irrespective of the applied method of double taxation relief. Finally, consider an
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endowment allocation where country i is skilled labor abundant with Li/(Li + Lj) = 0.15 and
Si/(Si + Sj) = 0.85. At this configuration, it headquarters mainly vertical MNEs that exploit
comparative advantages, and 41.14 (39.63) percent of the combined production of X are due
to country i’s foreign subsidiary activity under credit or exemption (deduction). Table 8 also
provides a summary of the effects of a one percent increase in each of the parameters of taxation
on country i’s MNE activity, separately.
> Table 8 <
The impact of statutory corporate tax rates on MNE activity: Under the exemption
method, any increase in the parent country tax rate stimulates foreign affiliate production.23
The reason for the positive nexus of parent country tax rates and outbound MNE activity is
that the change in its tax rate only affects domestic production. For similar reasons, a higher
tax rate in the host country reduces affiliate production there. Hence, the predicted effect of an
increase in parent (host) country corporate tax rates on a country’s outbound MNE activity is
positive (negative) under exemption.
With the credit method, the effects of corporate tax rates are ambiguous if horizontal MNE
activity prevails (i.e., the factor endowment differences are not important; see the first three
endowment configurations under tax credits in Table 8). As becomes apparent from Equation
(15), the impact of a tax increase depends on the differential between domestic and foreign
corporate tax rates. If the parent country is in an excess credit position (i.e., its corporate
tax rate is lower than the host country tax burden; see footnote c in Table 8) the effect of
the parent country’s tax increase is the same as under the exemption method. An increase in
the statutory tax rate of the parent country fosters its foreign affiliate production. The tax
increase, by contrast, applies to operating profits of foreign affiliates if the parent tax rate is
equal to or higher than the host country tax burden. This reduces foreign affiliate activities
23Slemrod (1990) was the first who has pointed to a positive relationship between the parent country tax rate
and outbound FDI, especially under the exemption system. In this regard, Hartman (1990, p. 121) criticized that
”... the sign of the home country taxation parameter is indeterminate from economic theory.” According to the
insights from our model, Slemrod rightfully suggested using parent country corporate tax rates as a determinant
of outbound FDI.
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of horizontal MNEs, but increases the domestic production of host country owned firms.24 For
similar reasons, an increase in the host country’s corporate tax rate induces the opposite effect.
With a deduction system, an increase in the corporate tax rate reduces MNE activities in
both countries,25 with one exception. If both countries are identical in endowment and size, an
increase in the host country corporate tax rate fosters foreign affiliate activity there, as long as
the tax burden becomes not prohibitively high. Although the tax burden is increased for all
(domestic and foreign) MNEs, the host country firms are even more exposed to the increased
tax rate.
The impact of withholding tax rates on MNE activity: The effects of a change in the
withholding tax rate are unambiguous and straight-forward. An increase in the host country’s
withholding tax rate raises the tax burden of the parent country’s MNEs only, irrespective of
the method of double taxation relief. Consequently, MNE activity is reduced there.
The impact of depreciation allowances on MNE activity: If the parent country provides
more generous depreciation allowances (reflected in a higher level of δi), the model predicts an
increase of the parent’s horizontal outbound MNE activity. The reason for this result lies in the
assumption that fixed costs are deductible in the country where they are actually paid (firm-
specific and domestic plant-specific fixed costs in the parent country and foreign plant-specific
fixed costs abroad). Hence, domestically headquartered MNEs gain the most, as they face the
highest fixed costs. However, this effect exists only under cross-hauling, i.e., the coexistence
of outbound and inbound horizontal MNE activity at small (zero) relative factor endowment
differences. The effects of depreciation allowances are reversed if large relative factor endowment
differences exist and vertical MNEs prevail.26 Since vertical MNEs do not operate a production
facility at the headquarters location, they only can deduct fixed plant set-up costs (in contrast to
domestic NEs or horizontal MNEs). Accordingly, an increase in domestic depreciation allowances
24In the case of identical factor endowments, the impact of a parent country’s tax increase on foreign affiliate
activity is only positive if both countries are in an excess credit position, i.e., (tj−twi (1−ti)) < ti < (tj+twj (1−tj)),
obtaining the same result as with the exemption method.
25As discussed above, the deduction method leads to zero MNE activity for a small country. For such a situation,
we are not able to identify a change in MNE activity due to an increase in the tax parameters. However, to
illustrate the impact of tax changes we re-parameterize the model such that MNE activity arises in the initial
equilibrium (see footnote b in Table 8).
26The effects of δi and δj are also reversed if depreciation allowances are not only applied to fixed costs but
also to variable costs, as indicated in Footnote 16.
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leads to a distortion in favor of domestic NEs and vertical outbound MNE activity is crowded
out. An increase in the depreciation allowances in an unskilled labor abundant host country
attracts even more affiliate production there and fosters the parent country’s vertical outbound
MNE activity. In the remaining factor configurations, we obtain the opposite sign to a change
in depreciation allowances in the parent country.
5.2 Third country tax effects on bilateral FDI
The setup of our model also allows us to calculate effects of a tax change in the third country on
the bilateral investment activities. We start with the same four endowment scenarios as in the
previous simulations, but now change the tax parameters of the third country. As the method of
double taxation between the third country and the two other countries also influences the sign
and strength of the third-country effect we run the simulations for all three forms. The results
summarized in Table 9 suggest that the factor endowments scenarios tend to drive the third
country effects. This intuitively makes sense, since the sign and magnitude of third country
effects depends on the prevailing plant configuration.27
> Table 9 <
If countries i and j are identical in the relative factor endowments and therefore horizontal
MNEs prevail, the third country effects differ substantially between small and large countries.
The underlying reasoning is that the tax changes in country k increase (decrease) the outbound
FDI from country k into the large (small) country j. This, in turn, reduces (increases) the market
shares of both domestic NEs and the HMNEs of country i in country j. If the host country
j is relatively large compared to country i, the loss in market shares will be less pronounced.
Hence, the share of bilateral FDI from i to j will decline. In contrast, a small domestic sector
in country j will lose relatively more and, therefore, the share of bilateral affiliate production of
HMNEs of country i in j will increase. In case of identical countries, firms will lose equally and
their share of affiliate production remains unaffected. To predict the sign of the third country
effects for country pairs only differing in size, all that needs to be determined is the effect of
27The extent of the tax rate change we are considering is too small to change the plant configuration. In
consequence, a multitude of different and strong third country effects are possible, but the determination of these
is beyond the scope of this paper.
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the tax change on the outbound FDI from country k. For the exemption and credit system
this is intuitive, as it is a reverse case of the situation described in the previous subsection. If
countries i and j apply the deduction method but the exemption method with country k, the
sign for the bilateral withholding tax rate changes to the positive with the exception of the small
country case. This is due to the fact that both countries i and j are exposed to the increase
in the withholding tax rate, so that the tax burden on both inbound and outbound investment
increases. This results in a reduction of output by all firms, which is larger for the firms with
relatively more multinational activity.
With strong differences in relative factor endowments between countries i and j (i.e., cases
where VMNEs emerge), the model clearly predicts positive third country effects of tax rate
changes. Again, the reason can be found in the plant configuration in country j. In this
setting, of foreign affiliate production originates solely from VMNEs. These are not directly
affected by tax changes in country k. In contrast, firms headquartered in j are horizontal MNEs
and, therefore, are exposed to a tax change in k. As a consequence, an increase in either the
corporate tax rate or the withholding tax rate reduces the profits and market shares of the
HMNEs, implying an increase of the share of affiliate production in country j. The increase
of depreciation allowances in country k reduces the tax burden of the HMNEs and, therefore,
increases their market share. This leads to a reduction in the share of affiliate production in
country j by country i based VMNEs.
6 Empirical analysis
To confront the theoretical predictions of the model with the data, we estimate a specification
of log stocks of bilateral outward foreign direct investment of parent country i in host country j
and year t (LFDIijt) in a parsimonious specification including parent and host country statutory
corporate tax rates, depreciation allowances, bilateral withholding tax rates and parent and host
country GDP. The model in Section 4 suggests that comparative static effects are nonmonotonic
in two regards. First, depreciation allowances affect MNE activity of relatively rich (skilled
labor or capital abundant) parent countries differently than that of poorer ones. To capture this
effect, we include an interaction term for both parent and host country depreciation allowances
with GDP variables, separately. Second, the comparative static effects are different across the
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applied methods of double taxation relief. To allow for the latter, we estimate the model not
only for the pooled sample but also for credit countries and exemption countries, separately.
Otherwise, we focus on a linear approximation of the nexus between tax parameters and log
foreign direct investment:
LFDIijt = β1ti,t−1 + β2tj,t−1 + β3twij,t−1 + β4δi,t−1 + β5δj,t−1
+β6δi,t−1 ×DSKit/SKjt>median(SKit/SKjt) + β7δj,t−1 ×DSKit/SKjt>median(SKit/SKjt)
+β8LGDPi,t−1 + β9LGDPj,t−1 + µij + λt + εijt. (22)
The variables ti,t−1 and tj,t−1 are the once-lagged statutory corporate tax rates of the parent
and the host country, respectively. twij,t−1 is the once-lagged withholding tax rate MNEs of i face
in country j. δi,t−1 and δj,t−1 are the once lagged depreciation allowances of i and j, respectively.
DSKit/SKjt>median(SKit/SKjt) is an indicator variable which is one if country i’s GDP per capita
relative to j is larger than the median. This variable indicates large differences in skilled labor
and capital endowments between parent and host countries. LGDPi,t−1 and LGDPj,t−1 are
once lagged log GDPs of the parent and the host country, respectively. β1-β9 are unknown slope
parameters, µij and λt are specific constants for country-pair ij and year t, respectively. Finally,
εijt is a remainder error term.
Fixed country-pair effects control for the impact of relatively time-invariant variables such
as relative factor endowments, while fixed time effects capture the impact of variables that
have little variance across country-pairs such as third-country tax variables (see the sensitivity
analysis for an explicit impact of third-country variables). We estimate sample selection models
for panel data (see Wooldridge, 1995) to control for possible systematic selection effects.28 The
most important results are summarized in Table 10.
> Table 10 <
The table includes three sets of results. The one on the left-hand side represents parameter
28We follow Wooldridge (1995) to model the constants µij as functions of time-averaged explanatory variables.
The sample selection equation includes all corporate tax variables and GDP as in the outcome equation. The
inverse Mills’ ratios are calculated for each year separately from annual probit models.
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estimates and test statistics for the full sample (covering credit, exemption, and deduction coun-
tries). The results in the center are obtained when focusing on exemption countries exclusively.
And the figures on the right-hand side of Table 10 are obtained with the sub-sample of credit
countries only. We indicate whether the sign of the point estimate of a parameter is in line with
the theoretical model in Section 4 (Y ) or not (N). In some cases, the theoretical model does not
provide unambiguous predictions of tax parameter changes, which we indicate by ? in Table 10.
The findings of our regression analysis can be summarized as follows. In line with previous
empirical evidence, parent and host country size are positively related to bilateral stocks of
outward FDI. While sample selection is significant in the full sample, there is no significant
selection bias in the estimated model parameters for the exemption or credit countries alone.
As for the tax effects, broadly speaking, the impact of host country tax parameters (tj,t−1,
δj,t−1, and twij,t−1) tends to be in line with the theoretical hypotheses.
29 Parent country tax
parameters (ti,t−1 and δi,t−1) exert an indirect impact on bilateral MNE activity in the theoretical
model. Their empirical effects tend to contradict the theoretical hypotheses significantly for
exemption countries. While the magnitude of the tax effects differs significantly across the
considered samples in Table 10, the signs of the point estimates are identical for all variables
included. Overall, it seems easier to identify the expected direct effects of host country corporate
taxation as compared to the indirect ones of parent country corporate taxation.
The results in Table 10 are based on the notion that third-country effects are relatively
homogeneous across dyads and are captured by the country-pair and time fixed effects. In
a sensitivity analysis, we relax this assumption and include inverse-distance-weighted30 third-
country effects of GDP (to be interpreted as market potential), the statutory tax rate, the
withholding tax rate, and the depreciation allowance parameter.
> Table 11 <
29There is no clear-cut hypothesis about the impact of statutory corporate taxes (ti,t−1 and tj,t−1) on bilateral
FDI neither in the full sample nor for credit countries.
30In particular, we consider host countries to be “neighbors” if their capitals are located within a radius of 600
kilometers. Then, we divide the respective variables by the great circle distance between the respective capitals.
We experimented with alternative cut-offs. It turns out that third-country effects of countries within a larger
radius of, say, 900 kilometers are significantly smaller, indicating that the impact of tax policy variables and even
market potential drops off dramatically with a distance of more than 600 kilometers. Also, after controlling for
market potential, using GDP-over-distance-based weights does not lead to much different results from the ones
we report here.
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Notice that we do not report predicted signs of the third-country variables for various reasons.
As discussed above, the results of Table 9 do not suggest clear effects of third-country tax
parameters on bilateral MNE activity. The findings are more suggestive of whether changes in
third-country tax parameters and GDP exert some time-variant impact on bilateral FDI.
Table 11 summarizes the parameters and test statistics of interest. First of all, the consid-
eration of third-country variables in the econometric models does not alter the coefficients of
the parent and host country tax policy variables dramatically. For instance, none of the para-
meters in Table 11 exhibits a sign which is different from its counterpart in Table 10. Even the
magnitude of the coefficients is similar between the two tables. The third-country variables –
including corporate tax policy instruments as well as market potential – are jointly significant
in all samples. As before, there is evidence of a significant sample selection bias only in the full
sample of country-pairs.
The results in Tables 10 and 11 suggest some policy conclusions from a host country’s
perspective. For convenience, let us focus on the findings in Table 10 and especially on the
nexus between the host country statutory tax rate (tj,t−1) and the corresponding depreciation
allowance parameter (δj,t−1). Unlike the withholding tax rate, these tax parameters can be
changed unilaterally. Suppose that policy makers were interested in the inward-FDI-neutral
tj,t−1/δj,t−1-trajectory at any given set of bilateral withholding tax rates. Then, results suggest
that the trajectory is negatively sloped for the average host country. An economy would have
to reduce its statutory corporate tax rate by 0.64 percentage points to neutralize the effect of
a one-percentage-point increase in the depreciation allowance parameter on inward FDI. The
slope of the tj,t−1/δj,t−1-trajectory is similar for exemption countries. On the contrary, a country
applying the credit method would have to raise its statutory corporate tax rate by about 0.25
percentage points to neutralize the impact of a one-percentage-point increase in its depreciation
allowance parameter on inward FDI.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we provide insights into the frequency and extent of changes in three corporate
tax instruments – statutory corporate tax rates, the deductibility of fixed cost from the tax base,
and withholding tax rates on dividend payments such as repatriated profits – and their role for
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multinational (MNE) activity such as bilateral foreign direct investment (FDI).
The paper delivers interesting insights that are generally relevant for hypothesis testing and
the specification of empirical models for the nexus between profit taxes and multinational firm
activity. For instance, we find that changes in tax instruments are relatively frequent in a sample
of 52 parent and 45 host countries over the period 1991-2004: for more than 40 percent of the
host countries at least one of the considered profit tax instruments changes in the average year.
Moreover, a change in one instrument is frequently combined with a change in at least one
other profit tax instrument. This suggests that the impact of corporate profit taxation on FDI
may hardly be analyzed by means of micro-econometric tools for binary treatments or natural
experiments. Rather, empirical stylized facts support methods suitable for panel data with fixed
dyadic and time effects.
Moreover, a general equilibrium model of national and multinational firms puts forward
hypotheses about the impact of the three tax instruments separately on multinational activity.
The tax policy instruments exhibit non-monotonic effects on MNE activity. In fact, each tax
instrument exerts an impact on each and every margin of adjustment at the firm level. There are
direct effects on MNE profits as well as indirect effects through profits on non-MNEs or foreign
MNEs. It turns out that “the” effective tax rate becomes an artifact with a manifold of margins
of adjustment across different integration strategies at the firm level. Different combinations of
corporate profit tax instruments may lead to an identical level or change of the effective tax
rate for the average MNE, yet the resulting impact on FDI or other modes of MNE activity
may differ due to heterogeneous indirect effects on other firms. Hence, we propose to focus on
instrument-specific parameter estimates rather than ones of effective tax rates.
A large-scale panel data analysis suggests that empirical estimates of the impact of host
country tax instruments are mostly in line with the theoretical hypotheses. The estimates in-
dicate that the average country has to reduce its statutory corporate tax rate by about 0.64
percentage points to neutralize the impact of a one-percentage-point increase in depreciation
allowances. According to the theoretical model, host country profit tax variables exert a di-
rect effect on bilateral MNE activity, while parent country tax rates mainly affect it indirectly
(through effects on national firms and foreign MNEs). Empirically, we find support of negative
direct effects of parent country profit tax instruments rather than of positive total effects which
are dominated by indirect effects on other firms.
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The findings certainly point to omitted variables problems with empirical specifications,
where corporate profit taxation is captured by the inclusion of statutory corporate tax rates
only. However, also the use of publicly available effective tax rates cannot be recommended
and is not supported by general equilibrium models, where firms can choose their integration
strategy from a portfolio of choices. For future work on the impact of profit taxation on FDI
it seems more fruitful to capture the relevant tax instruments separately and allow for their
non-monotonic impact on firm activity – multinational or national in scope.
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Appendix: Data sources and variable description
1. Data on foreign direct investment: We use bilateral outward FDI in U.S. dollars between 1991 and
2004 from UNCTAD’s Major FDI Indicators (2007).
Parent country coverage: The sample contains a total of 52 parent economies: Albania, Australia, Austria,
Belgium, Bulgaria, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark,
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy,
Japan, Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mexico, Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pak-
istan, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States.
Host country coverage: There are 45 host countries in the sample: Albania, Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Bulgaria, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg,
Mexico, Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Slovak Republic,
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States.
2. Tax rates, depreciation allowances, tax treaties: Information on tax codes and bilateral tax treaties
are primarily taken from the following online databases of the International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation
(IBFD):
• Africa - Taxation & Investment
• Asia-Pacific - Taxation & Investment
• Central/Eastern Europe - Taxation & Investment
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• Latin America - Taxation & Investment
• Corporate Taxation in Europe
• Global Tax Surveys
• Tax News Service
• Tax Treaties Database
Additionally, we exploit information of tax law from the following printed publications:
• Arthur Anderson, 1992-1996. A tax guide to Europe, London: Arthur Andersen
• Baker&McKenzie, 1999. Survey of the effective tax burden in the European Union, Amsterdam.
• Commission of the European Communities, 1992. Report of the committee of independent experts on
company taxation, Brussels and Luxembourg.
• Commission of the European Communities, 2001. Towards an internal market without tax obstacles.
A strategy for providing companies with a consolidated corporate tax base for their EU-wide activities,
COM (2001) 582 final, Brussels.
• Coopers & Lybrand, 1991-1998. International tax summaries : a guide for planning and decisions,
Chichester: John Wiley & Sons.
• Ernst&Young, 2003. Company taxation in the new EU Member states survey of the tax regimes and
effective tax burdens for multinational investors, Frankfurt am Main.
• Ernst&Young, 1998-2003. Worldwide Corporate Tax Guide, Frankfurt am Main.
• IBFD, 1994-1999. Central and East European Tax Directory, Amsterdam.
• IBFD, 1990-2005. European Tax Handbook, Amsterdam.
• IBFD, 1990-2001. Steuerberaterhandbuch Europa, Bonn: Stollfuss.
• IBFD, 1990-1994. Taxation in European Socialist Countries, Amsterdam.
• Matthew Bender, 1990-2003. Foreign tax and trade briefs : international withholding tax treaty guide,
New York: LexisNexis.
• Nexia International, 1992-2003. The international Handbook of Corporate and Personal Taxation,
London: LexisNexis.
• OECD, 1991. Taxing Profits in a Global Economy: Domestic and International Issues, Paris: Or-
ganisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
• PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 1999. Spectre: Study of potential of effective corporate tax rates in Europe,
Report commissioned by the Ministry of Finance in the Netherlands, Amsterdam.
• PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 1990-2004. Corporate taxes: worldwide summaries, Hoboken: Wiley.
• Yoo, K.-Y., 2003. Corporate taxation of foreign direct investment income 1991-2001, OECD Eco-
nomics Department Working Paper No. 365, Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development.
The computation of the net present value of depreciation allowances is derived in King and Fullerton
(1984) and described in more detail in Devereux and Griffith (1999) and Yoo (2003). The corresponding
information on the number of years for which depreciations can be claimed (’depreciation rate’), the
depreciation system (i.e., straight line or declining balance schedule) and on (general) investment incentives
(e.g., extra first-year allowances in Australia, Poland or Spain) are taken from the above mentioned sources.
In cases where a firm has several opportunities to choose from, we use in line with the literature the most
generous one.
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